

Public or Private Children's Services? Privatization in Retrospect

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Abstract:

This historical study of privatization, based on archival research and an examination of the relevant literature of the period, illustrates the changing relations, tensions, mutual dependencies, and altered policy stances of the public and private child welfare sectors preceding and during the period of rapid expansion of federal purchase of service moneys that followed a series of amendments to the Social Security Act in the 1960s and 1970s. The financially strapped voluntary service sector was ideologically divided about seeking increased public moneys, but it quickly accepted the new funds once they became available. This inquiry into the background of privatization contributes to the understanding of the unique pattern of service delivery in the United States.

Introduction: Persistent Dilemmas in Governmental/Voluntary Social Service Relations

Observers of contemporary social services are acutely aware that privatization has become the ascendant modality for service delivery, eclipsing, at least for the moment, services delivered directly by public agencies. Over the last fifteen to twenty years, there has been an accelerating trend towards implementing new governmental initiatives through private organizations including those under non-profit and recently for-profit auspices; in addition, some states are now experimenting with privatizing very traditional public functions such as public assistance administration. The amounts of public monies being spent on purchased services has been rising dramatically, having increased \$.5 billion between 1991 and 1996 in the state of Massachusetts alone, according to a conservative critic (Loconte, 1997: 22).

Several books and studies published over the last dozen years have examined recent developments in increased privatization and contracting out of formerly governmental functions as well as newly developing social service agenda (Gilbert, 1977 and 1983; Abramovitz, 1987; Kamerman and Kahn, 1989; Demone and Gibelman, 1989; Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Hall, 1995; Brilliant, 1997; Gibelman and Demone, 1998; Hegar, 1998). Explanations for the acceleration of service contracting have included ideological preferences for privately delivered services (particularly from the Reagan era, but stemming

certainly from the revenue sharing/new federalism approach of the Nixon administration); the presumed efficiency and cost savings associated with privately provided services (including the breaking up of public sector unions); the increased flexibility in service development and service elimination available through this mechanism (for instance, the development of community based residential programs as a substitute for public institutions in the mental health and retardation fields); the greater professionalism linked to private sector agencies; the presumption that privately provided services are more carefully attuned to the needs of clients and communities (i.e., that they are less bureaucratic); and, finally, that such services are less stigmatized than are those delivered directly by public entities.

While most investigators acknowledge that the practice of public agencies purchasing services from voluntary social services agencies is not a new phenomenon, most have been impressed by the accelerated pace of privatization, a term that has replaced the formerly used public/private partnership. What is more, most voluntary service agencies have become highly financially dependent upon government money for their survival, many receiving over 70% of their funds from federal and state sources (Smith and Lipsky, 1993, chap. 3). Even more or less traditional child welfare agencies--the focus of much of the rest of this article--received 59% of their income from governmental sources in 1986; in 1960, that figure was 28% (Smith and Lipsky, 1993: 63, citing surveys conducted by the Child Welfare League of America [hereafter, CWLA]).

The general impression of the current service-delivery situation is that voluntary agencies are eager to accept public funds, indeed that they are nearly totally reliant upon them. However, a critique of this situation—one that replicates an earlier debate—may be in the making. For instance, a recent lead article of the *Boston Globe's* Metro/Region section proclaimed: **State funding of nonprofits escalates: Some worry about loss of independence?** (Valdes-Rodriguez, 1998). The article details the situation confronting many private non-profit agencies in the contemporary social service arena: social services provided by voluntary agencies but paid for with public funds, and the perception by many in the private sector that their ability to fashion unique approaches has been severely compromised. Spokespersons for sectarian agencies particularly express this view. The newspaper article referred to quotes Joseph Doolin, president of Catholic Social Services of Boston and associated with the agency for nearly ten years bemoaned the fact that in 1989, 75% of the agency's funding came from the state. In an effort to regain more independence and to reinstate an approach more consistent with a religious organization, Doolin is noted to have succeeded in cutting back the percentage of public funding to 50%.

Because it was using state funds, Catholic Charities was required to remove religious items like Bibles and crucifixes from AIDS hospices, for example, and residents were not allowed to hold prayer groups. "It made no sense at all," Doolin said.... "I sought to lower our dependence on the government in a conscious way so

that we could pursue initiatives that are totally privately funded and that reflect our values," said Doolin. (Valdes-Rodrigues, 1998).

These sentiments mirror tensions that have frequently characterized the voluntary sector's relationship to public funding authorities but have become particularly acute as private agencies have become nearly totally dependent on public monies for their survival. While public funding of privately provided social services has been a traditional pattern in the U.S., a great expansion in what has come to be called privatization occurred following the introduction of federal dollars as a result of amendments to the Social Security Act between 1962 and 1974.

In order to understand better the dynamics leading to the dramatic changes that occurred in the post-1967 era, the writer sought to answer two questions: *Did the voluntary sector actively pursue changes in federal legislation in order to obtain federal funding in the 1950s and 1960s?* and *What was the relationship between the public child welfare sector and the voluntary agencies during that time period ?* While the answers to these questions are not definitive, what is clear is that many actors in the voluntary sector recognized that their relationships with governmental authorities were critical for voluntary sector's survival while they also feared the loss of independence mirrored in the recent statement quoted above..

A basic difference between the initiative to expand the purchase of service model in the 1960s and today's privatization efforts can be discerned. The

privatization push of the last twenty years is associated with downsizing, cost containment, and deregulation of government functions (Pierson, 1994; Kahn, 1998). However, the expansion of public contracting that began in the late 1960s initially stemmed from the opposite impulse, following the entry of federal monies to support social services in the late 1960s (Gilbert, 1983; Morris, 1985). The initial explosion of the social service sector, a phenomenon well documented by many writers (e.g., Derthick, 1975; Gilbert, 1983; Morris, 1985), can be seen as part of the expansion of the welfare state, characteristic of late-stage industrial capitalist societies, where large-scale government programs provide a floor of income and services in an effort to achieve minimum standards of living, health and social development for the population as a whole and as a counterbalance to free market forces that create extreme inequalities in living conditions and life chances. The sense that the U.S. was becoming a more normal welfare state was reflected in the writing of the mid-1960s (Schottland, 1967, Introduction; Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965).

Modern social services and modern social work developed from the Progressive Era, but the scale and nature of the social welfare enterprise changed with the entry of the federal government, a result of the New Deal. The process gathered momentum in the public and private social services and mental health after World War II--but especially during the Great Society. It was the expansion of scale and scope from the mid-1960s to the 1980s that

encouraged and supported the large, publicly assisted, voluntary service expansion....(Kahn, 1998: viii).

I turn now to an analysis of the development of public/private relationships in social service delivery, beginning with an initial summary of the early history of those relationships and followed by an in-depth examination of the activities and discussions among key actors involved before and during the entry of the federal government as a financial backer of privately-delivered social services in the 1960s, a key turning point in the history of social service privatization and the impetus for enormous expansion of the voluntary sector. Because government and voluntary agencies were both early involved in providing services for children and their families, because both sectors were engaged in developing policies to effect delivery of those services, and in order to provide a focus for this discussion of policy development, this article concentrates on the child welfare field.

The era of the 1950s and 1960s evidenced considerable and often vigorous discussion and debate about what the relationship between the public and private social service systems ought to be. Most leaders in the voluntary sector were eager to gain the increased revenues that federal funding might provide, but others --presaging the critique that Joseph Doolin now makes about public funding-- were wary that an increased reliance on public funding would mean their loss of independence, a lessened ability to be experimental, and a

compromise of their roles as advocates and social critics.

Early History

Intersections between the public and private spheres of social service provision have characterized the American system of caretaking virtually from its inception and, indeed, predate the English Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 from which American patterns of social care have derived (for a summary of this history, see Hegar, 1998). Indenture, contracting out and boarding out were variations on a theme whereby public poor relief authorities relied upon private individuals to provide shelter, food and work for various classes of dependents, including children, through the colonial period. From the mid-1800s through the end of the century, when there were growing numbers of dependent poor who both alarmed public authorities and justified the establishment of municipal and state-run public institutions, an era of erecting public indoor relief facilities (almshouses, workhouses, mental hospitals, juvenile correctional institutions) began (Trattner, 1994; Grob 1973). Following the Pierce veto of 1856, when the President rejected federal assistance to the states for the purpose of building mental hospitals on Constitutional grounds and with the exception of Civil War-related programs including the Freedman's Bureau and pensions to war veterans and their widows (Trattner, 1994; Skocpol, 1992), public policies to alleviate and remedy the difficulties of various classes of dependents remained the responsibility of local and state governments until the Depression and the New Deal.

Social policy for dependent groups in the U.S. has been characterized by

the development of dual structures of care, the public and the private, and by their intersection. In particular, the granting of jurisdiction to care for otherwise public charges to private institutions and agencies and public subsidy of them has been a recurrent practice (Kramer, 1964). Many of these institutions were orphanages or other child-caring institutions, and their auspices were both religious and secular (Hegar, 1998). For example, Hegar (1998), drawing on documents for the Orphan Asylum Society in New York City, found that in 1809, two years after its founding, the society successfully petitioned the New York legislature for funds and within another two years was receiving an annual subsidy for its work. Public support of private philanthropy was very common, particularly on the East Coast where there was a proliferation of private charitable and reform organizations throughout the 19th century. This aid took two forms: subsidy (a lump sum allotment to support the activities of the organization) and purchase of care (a fee to cover all or part of the costs for care of individual recipients).

Ralph Kramer (1964), in an elegant analysis of the development of social policy in the U.S., has contributed to the understanding of the so-called 'exceptionalism' of the United States as compared to most of western Europe by emphasizing the role that private philanthropy and its interaction with the public sector have played.¹ Explanations of why the U.S. is a 'reluctant welfare state' have focused on such factors as the absence of a strong union movement and labor-based political parties (Piven, 1992; Piven and Cloward, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1990); the fragmented U.S. governmental structure, including the

federal and state systems and the separation of powers at each level; American cultural traditions emphasizing individualism and minimalist government; the heterogeneity of the American population (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965); and racism as a divisive force militating against an effective working class movement (Quadagno, 1994). According to Kramer's analysis, the predominance of private care-giving institutions described earlier, relegated the later-appearing public institutions to a residual function with responsibility for those least amenable to good outcomes: the chronically mentally ill, the mentally retarded, the criminal (Kramer, 1964, chap. II). This pattern was reinforced by the very development of public support of the private institutions and was bolstered by the power of the elites who were often associated with private philanthropy. In addition, the seeming financial savings to the public coffers garnered by utilizing already-built institutions discouraged investing in capital outlays. Another argument in favor of subsidizing and utilizing private institutions for public purposes was the association of public programs with the spoils system and the squandering of taxes (Kramer, 1964: 35-36). Thus, government was denigrated as a positive ameliorator of social problems. State and local subsidies to private agencies, including sectarian agencies, though strongly criticized by some (as will be shown below), became an entrenched method of social provision in the U.S. and forms the basis, it is suggested, for the system of privatization we see today.

By the 1880s, several states had established patterns of paying for children placed in privately run institutions, many of them through annual lump-sum

subsidies. In New York, legislation required that children be placed in institutions run by members of their own faith (Hegar, 1998). Serious criticisms of these practices began to be voiced around the same time, most influentially by Amos G. Warner of the Baltimore Charity Organization Society who conducted studies of poverty and philanthropy and whose book, *American Charities*, was considered the authority on the subject. Kramer (1964) summarizes Warner's objections to public subsidy of private charity as follows:

- (1) Voluntary agencies encourage pauperism by disguising it. (2) There is no real economy because so many duplicate institutions are necessary, one for each sectarian group, and since intake policies are not controlled, tax funds are used to support the care of all the inmates of private institutions. (3) Special pressures are put upon the legislature in the form of "log rolling" to influence them. (4) It tends to dry up the source of private funds. (5) It destroys the freedom of the voluntary agency (Kramer, 1964: 37).

Concluding his scathing description of subsidy practices gone wild, Warner (1894) called for reforms that most today would recognize as sound administrative practices where public moneys are involved:

First, on behalf of the poor as well as the taxpayers it [government] must provide for the thorough inspection of subsidized institutions, and the systematic auditing of their accounts....Second, the State

must keep in the hands of its own officials the right of deciding what persons shall be admitted to the benefits for which it pays, and how long such each person may continue to receive those benefits....Third, subsidies should only be granted on the principle of specific payment for specific work (Warner, 1894: 353).

From the Progressive Era to the New Deal: The Growth of the Public Sector

Warner's pronouncements were made around the beginning of the Progressive Era, a period of history marked by exposes of the more exploitative aspects of unbridled capitalism and many successful reform efforts aimed at bettering social conditions through increased governmental regulation and provision. The plight of poor children was a particular emphasis of social reformers who, beginning in the 1890s, advocated for a set of interrelated laws and programs including ending child labor, compelling school attendance, establishing juvenile courts, and promoting publicly provided mothers' pensions. This last measure, fought bitterly by private charity spokespersons who abhorred outdoor relief (Lowell, 1890), specifically aimed to provide a means for "worthy mothers" to support their children at home and thus eliminate unnecessary family break-up and placement in substitute care.

Among the achievements of Progressive reformers and advocates, and staffed by some of their most articulate representatives, was the establishment of the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1912. The Bureau's founding was recognized as a

symbol of growing governmental authority, and tensions with private sector interests were clear. For instance, many in the organized charity sector opposed both the founding of the Bureau and the development of public child welfare programs (Weiss, 1974). This research and policy-recommending agency, the first federal agency with a social policy agenda, was instrumental in promoting an increased role for government in meeting the needs of the nation's children, especially poor children. While remaining on close terms with many voluntary agencies and organizations, particularly the Child Welfare League with which it was closely allied, the Bureau nonetheless represented a thrust towards "public responsibility" (a term repeatedly used in Bureau documents and correspondence) for social problems by advocating for the development of public health clinics for children, mothers' pensions, the juvenile court and, beginning in the early 1920s, public child welfare agencies.² The Bureau's mandate, to research and publicize social problems affecting children and innovative policy solutions, was carried out with fervor, and the agency has left a historical legacy in its many published studies, bulletins, journal contributions, and records of its activities.

The Children's Bureau's preference for public assumption of welfare activities is evidenced in an early controversy involving an effort to reform the juvenile court in Washington, D.C. so that it would have the power to review placements of children committed by it to the Board of Guardians, a private agency in the city. In 1914-15 when this controversy arose, the court was a symbol of a new and vibrant public agency that would have broad powers over

children and their families. The proposed increase in the court's power, a position fully backed by Julia Lathrop, the first Chief of the Bureau, irked the private welfare organizations. In 1916, Lathrop wrote to Henry W. Thurston, a faculty member of the New York School of Philanthropy and a well-known child welfare expert:

You and I do not need to beat about the bush. I am in favor of county and State boards for protecting children....I have no confidence in a theory of law which reposes greater responsibility in the agents of large unsalaried boards than in the bench....(Lathrop, 1916).

Over the next twenty years, the Bureau would become disillusioned with the juvenile court as an effective public institution but not with the idea of public assumptions of child welfare activities, though it had to act cautiously. By the early 1930s, it was openly championing state and county child welfare programs as agents of prevention and early intervention into family difficulties and as more effective than the courts (Rosenthal, 1986). At the same time, however, state support of private agencies, especially those providing institutional care, continued (Hegar, 1998).

An opportunity to expand the development of public child welfare agencies came with the writing of the Social Security Act and the child welfare provisions that the Bureau pushed for inclusion. In 1931, although twelve states had legislation creating or enabling county departments of social services, only

5% of all counties with less than 30,000 population had public social workers. The Bureau's original child welfare proposals called for \$1.5 million of federal money, to be matched by state dollars, in a grant-in-aid program available to all the states for administrative costs related to establishing and running public child welfare programs (federal moneys could not be used to pay for foster care or similar services). The proposal won the approval of the Committee on Economic Security (the writers of the Act), but immediately, there was strong objection from private child welfare agencies and particularly from the Catholic constituency that feared both governmental control of their activities and usurpation of their role by public agencies. Msgr. O'Grady of Washington, D.C., who was to remain a leading spokesperson for Catholic social service interests and who was particularly wary of encroachment by public agencies, threatened to lobby against the child welfare proposals. Eventually a compromise was worked out, limiting the development of public agencies in "primarily rural states" where private agencies were generally unknown. In addition, the requirement for matching state money would be eliminated because it was feared that with limited funds, Eastern states with long-standing subsidy practices would meet their matching requirements by withdrawing subsidies from the private agencies. The compromise allowed the legislation not only to go forward but also to receive the active endorsement from the Church (Witte, 1963).

Within two years, ten states enacted provisions for statewide child welfare services, and by 1939, all states as well as Alaska, Hawaii and Washington, D.C.

were cooperating with the Bureau through approved state plans (Lenroot, 1960), but the actual funding remained very low. Federal funds were restricted to paying for staff and administrative expenses; they could not be used to pay for foster or institutional care and thus were unavailable for reimbursing private agencies for care services (Atkinson, 1938), a prohibition that conformed to the principles set out by Harry Hopkins for other welfare functions: No federal money would be used to purchase services from private agencies (Coughlin, 1965, p. 126).

The meagerness of the federal appropriations for child welfare services, in combination with the decision to allow the states to implement a variety of activities meant that the influence of public child welfare was more symbolic than actual (Atkinson, 1938). Most child welfare services were related to foster care despite the Bureau's interest in preventive programs. For years, the Bureau, along with its Child Welfare Advisory Committee, and other sympathetic experts endeavored to increase both the level of federal funding for public child welfare services and the extent of its jurisdiction (U.S. White House Conference on Children in a Democracy, 1940). The Bureau had to be diplomatic in its dealings with private sector agencies; however, there are clear intimations that its staff were concerned that huge investments in buildings and entrenched institutionally-based approaches to dealing with children in need of care, inhibited the growth of more progressive methods of handling such cases (in-home services and foster care rather than institutional care).

It is generally conceded...that despite the enormous contribution of

private agencies to child welfare, some of them have in time come to be in some respects an obstructive force in the development of an adequate program of child welfare. Anxious to continue their activities, some of them have discouraged the exercise by public authorities of their responsibility for child care (U.S. White House Conference on Children in a Democracy, 1940).

It was not until 1958 that the Act was amended to extend jurisdiction of federally assisted public child welfare programs to all states and localities in the country, and 1962 that prohibitions against paying for foster care were eliminated.

Rebecca Hegar (1998), citing other researchers, reports that private child welfare agencies during this period were under enormous financial pressure as a result of the Depression: agencies lost donors, public funds to subsidize them were curtailed, and the demands on the agencies increased. The result was increased reliance on public child welfare services, funded almost entirely by the states, although many of these contracted out substitute care arrangements to private ones.

Church and State

Much private philanthropy, but by no means all, was developed through religious auspices, and, as Kramer (1964) and Coughlin (1965) have discussed, the various denominations took different positions on the question of the superiority of religiously sponsored social welfare as opposed to public programs. As a corollary, religious groups also differed in their interpretations of the

appropriateness of public subsidy or reimbursement for religiously provided social services. The main supporter of church-sponsored social welfare, including public support thereof, has been the Catholic Church, as evidenced in the O'Grady activity discussed above and below. Catholics, responding to what they interpreted as direct attempts of Protestants to convert their children through such efforts as the child-placing practices of Charles Loring Brace and others in the latter half of the nineteenth century, established their own powerful, largely institutionally-based welfare structures, particularly those for children (Trattner, 1994). Where they were able, especially in the large cities, they obtained public funding for the care of their wards, and they successfully established a legal theory that made distinctions between public aid to parochial social welfare and public aid to parochial education,³ This theory holds that since the children of the various denominations were to be public charges in any case, and since the First Amendment of the Constitution requires free exercise of religion, it was and is appropriate for public dollars to pay for care in religiously based institutions (for a discussion of this theory and the debates around it, see Kramer, 1964, chap. V; Kramer, 1966).

Although highly contested, this theory dominated through the 1960s, and not only did religiously sponsored institutions receive public moneys, but they also could and did discriminate against caring for wards from other religious backgrounds. Writing in the mid-1960s, Kramer found that religiously sponsored agencies also received tax exemptions as charitable institutions and, in many

cases, were not subject to licensing laws. Additionally, distinctions in attitudes about the primacy of religiously-based welfare institutions versus public ones could be discerned. Catholics placed emphasis on the supremacy of religious institutions and advocated for public support thereof while fearing the encroachment of government generally. Protestants preferred the growth of the public sector. Jews largely agreed with the Protestants but were also more than willing to take public moneys to support their agencies (Kramer, 1964). Bernard J. Coughlin, S.J. (1965), drawing on his doctoral study of various religious denominations and their involvement with social welfare, found similar attitudes expressed; however, what was of greater concern to many was the threat to their autonomy associated with the contracting for government money. Calling for governmental protection for a strong voluntary sector, in which religiously based institutions represent the moral and philosophical forces in society, Coughlin articulated, in a sophisticated and impassioned way, the Catholic position for public support of autonomous religious social welfare institutions at exactly the point when federal dollars for such purposes were just becoming available (Coughlin, 1965, chap. 8). Unlike Msgr. O'Grady, however, Coughlin applauded the trend enunciated by his mentor, Schottland, that pointed to an increase in public moneys, apparently from a developing thrust on the federal level, to be used to purchase services from voluntary agencies (Coughlin, 1965: 126).

Catholic agencies, which once demanded that all Catholic children be served by them and with public funding if necessary, were by 1960 relaxing this

position considerably (Coughlin, 1966). The question of the role of sectarian agencies and their relation to public support remains contested, as the quote near the beginning of this paper indicates. As the voluntary service sector struggled with developing policy to respond to the availability of federal moneys in the racially charged atmosphere of the late 1960s, it stated firmly that private agencies could not discriminate on the basis of race. However, participants in the policy-making group organized by the CWLA could not agree that sectarian agencies should serve those from other religious backgrounds (CWLA, 1968). Now that this issue has been resolved in favor of serving all comers, the question of religious position-taking within the service delivery setting (crosses on the wall, for instance) remains problematic.

Private Agencies in Crisis - Inching Towards New Partnerships with Government

Records and publications of two of the most important organizations representing child welfare interests in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Children's Bureau and the Child Welfare League of America, reveal increasing attention to documenting the arenas of exclusive and intersecting practice within and between the public and private sector agencies. The Bureau, as has been detailed above, maintained both a research-dissemination and an administrative function for child welfare services during this period of time. The League, founded in 1920 as a coordinating and advocacy body for the nation's private and public child welfare agencies, served an important policy-setting function for those agencies; was the

public voice for the child welfare profession; and coordinated lobbying efforts on occasion and when offered an opportunity to do so. Its executive director, Joseph Reid, was nationally recognized as a spokesperson for child welfare interests and for shepherding his constituency towards progressive child welfare practices. Together, these national bodies advocated for an expanded child welfare network that would require ever-increasing public expenditures to perform their rather traditional functions of investigations into problems such as child neglect and abuse, foster placement and supervision, institutional placement and (in the case of the private agencies) adoption.

A reading of the League's records and correspondence during this period⁴ shows that there was considerable concern that the private agencies were in financial difficulty for several reasons: United Funds and similar confederated funding sources had begun to reduce funding of the traditional child-serving agencies; private donations were similarly declining; and, perhaps most crucially, the agencies were in a losing competition to newer modes of intervention into individual and family problems, particularly psychiatric ones. Kramer (1964, Chap. IV), examining trends in the then-recent past, noted the declining revenues derived from private giving available to the voluntary agencies, resulting in a static service-giving capacity for those agencies, at the same time that governmental expenditures and directly provided services were growing rather dramatically. In 1929, government welfare accounted for 4.1% of the gross national product, more than doubling to 8.6% in 1955, while philanthropic

welfare remained stationary, 1.3% in 1929 and 1.5% in 1955 (Kramer, 1964: 73). At the same time, voluntary agencies--particularly those involved in child welfare--saw a greater proportion of their income coming from state dollars being used to purchase care, from 1.5% in 1938 to 5.05% in 1960, and a rapidly declining percentage of the funds expended by the United funds (Kramer, 1964: 79; 89). Kramer (1964:79-80) citing Ruth Werner's 1961 book, *Public Financing of Voluntary Agency Foster Care* published by the Child Welfare League, found that in 1956, half of public money for foster care was being spent directly by public agencies while the other half was purchasing care from voluntary ones. However, when three states (New York, Pennsylvania and North Dakota) with large purchase of service programs were excluded, 86% of the public foster care dollars were being spent by public child welfare programs directly. There was, moreover, great variability among the states in the use of purchased care and in some cities, where private agencies were well-established and where purchase of care arrangements were entrenched, most of the care was done by voluntary agencies paid for with public funds. In New York City, perhaps the most extreme example, 90% of the primarily sectarian voluntary agencies' funds came from public moneys (Kramer, 1964: 80). Private agency services were concentrated in adoption and institutional care, largely for dependent/neglected children (a holdover from the orphanages and likely a reason for concern about private sector practices), whereas the public agencies were more heavily involved in family foster care and services to children in their own

homes (Jeter, 1962).

A crisis in funding and even in mission was recognized by some in the private child welfare field. Thus, a meeting of the Committee on Principles and Responsibilities in Private Child Welfare held by the League in 1955 revealed a critique of the activities in the voluntary sphere. In answer to the question: What is Unique to the Private agency?, the discussants came up with three items: 1) to gratify the individual's sense of "charity"; 2) to serve as an effective advocate for more funding for children's services generally (a function the governmental agencies were unable to do directly) and as a spokesperson for children; and 3) to identify areas of unmet need. On the other hand, greater expertise was not a formulation that this group held; indeed, they stated that practices in many private agencies were often of low quality. In fact, the stance taken in the early 1950s was for an expansion of public sector agencies (remembering that federal funds were still restricted to rural areas) and limited purchase of care for individual children from voluntary agencies on a case by case basis (e.g., CWLA, Public Policy Committee, 1950).

This position was made very clear in a 1955 letter from Reid to Schottland, then Commissioner of Social Security, in response to legislative ideas probably raised by him and apparently floated at a recent meeting of the National Social Welfare Assembly:

In regard to "maximum utilization of other agencies providing similar or related services," we feel that this might be interpreted

to require purchase of services from voluntary agencies under circumstances that might interfere with the development of sound public programs. (CWLA , 1955, Box 43, Folder 2)

Schottland was a supporter of the voluntary sector, believed that progressive service experimentation took place largely within its purview, but recognized the need to develop standards regularize the relationships between public and private service entities. He also apparently approved of public support for the work that the voluntary agencies did, stating that private agencies, through their contributions-based work with otherwise public charges, were in essence subsidizing the public sector and not *vice versa* (Schottland, 1955).⁵

In the 1950s, the League had two working committees, one drawing up principles and policies on private child welfare and another doing the same for public child welfare. A 1958 position paper, the conclusion of a twelve-year process, consolidated these efforts, called for universal availability of child welfare services with government as ultimate backer, "as the only instrumentality representative of all of the people" by stimulating voluntary services and by direct provision for those not otherwise cared for (CWLA, Statement of Principles and Policies on Private and Public Child Welfare Administration, 1958). Again, individual purchase of service arrangements, to meet special needs (including religious ones), were supported, and language concerning specific contracts and accountability for such arrangements was included. The repeated

insistence upon case-by-case purchased care for specific purposes was the one recommendation that challenged the outright subsidy plan that still characterized some public funding arrangements with large, private organizations. The document was specific in its recommendations that voluntary agencies remain independent:

The chief source of private agency financing should be private contributions. The private agency must remain in control of its policies and retain its autonomy and freedom of action. When a large proportion of its services are used by another agency through a purchase of care plan, these powers are in jeopardy (*Ibid.* sec.10).

Similarly, agencies were advised to maintain autonomy from central fund-raising bodies (*Ibid.* Sec. 20). In a letter to Joseph Reid in which she commented on a draft copy of this document, Katherine Oettinger, Chief of the Children's Bureau, emphasized that the recommendations should not be misunderstood to mean that government had a financial responsibility towards the voluntary agencies nor that voluntary agencies were to be considered superior to the public ones (Oettinger, 1958).

The League's major concern with regard to the public agencies was assuring sufficient legislative mandates and funding to serve all children with needed services in a non-discriminatory manner (CWLA, Statement of Principles and Policies on Private and Public Child Welfare Administration, 1958, Sec.22).

This position was echoed testimony to increase the federal responsibility: increasing funds and extending public child welfare services to the whole country. Only half the counties in the U.S. had public workers devoted full time to child welfare work (Cohen, 1958).

This stance had the acceptance of those engaged in policy formation with the League. However, it was opposed by Msgr. O'Grady who had effectively blocked the effort to extend public child welfare services nationally in 1935. Appearing before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1956 to testify against extending federal moneys to cover the cities, O'Grady voiced the strong opinion that voluntary agencies were unduly criticized by government officials and that supporters of expanded federal involvement in child welfare services were threatening to undo the private sector.

It may be that there are certain people in our midst who do not think that we can solve our social welfare programs (sic) except through the power and the force of government...If our government believes in voluntary effort, it is hard to understand how it can propose legislation of this type.... Can all this be done by a few Government specialists, or can it be done only by those who are fired by the spirit of faith in the sacred character of the human personalities of children and of their parents? (O'Grady, 1956).

The work of the League in developing standards to govern the relationship between the public and private sector relations was echoed at the Children's

Bureau where a major study, examining the nature and distribution of child welfare services between public and voluntary agencies (referred to above) was published by the Children's Bureau in the early 1960s (Jeter, 1962), and preparation for this publication generated an enormous correspondence between the Bureau and many national voluntary organizations as well as individual voluntary agencies (U.S. Children's Bureau, 1959).⁶

In 1958 the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had appointed two advisory councils, one on public assistance and one on child welfare services, with a mandate to report to him and to Congress by the end of 1959. The recommendations on public assistance led to the well-known shift to a social service focus for ending welfare dependency authorized in the Social Security Amendments of 1962 (see below). The recommendations related to child welfare were focused on the implementation of the 1958 amendments, extending public services to all jurisdictions, and called for some important changes: broadening the definition of the services to include prevention and service provision in out of home care; expanding the reach of services to meet growing needs; and most importantly, strongly recommending increased funding to include federal participation in the payment for foster and other out of home care (Child Welfare Services: Report of the Advisory Committee, 1960). With respect to purchased care, the report stated:

The Council believes that public and voluntary agencies should

join ranks to make use of all available resources to improve services to children. It also endorses the principle of purchase of services by the public agency from qualified voluntary agencies whenever needed. Such services should be purchased on a case-by-case cost-of-care arrangement. In 1935 when the Social Security Act was passed, some States had programs to care for dependent children outside the family group, but no special provision was made for them through Federal grants....Today, because of the mounting costs of maintaining these youngsters away from home, they deserve top consideration by the Congress (*Ibid*: 4).

While the first paragraph quoted here evidenced nothing startling, the implications of the second were that federal funds could be used to pay for institutional and other privately provided out-of-home care if the recommendations were adopted.

A report prepared by the well-known social welfare scholars, Elizabeth Wickenden and Winifred Bell (1961), for the Advisory Committee on Public Welfare took a stronger cautionary position on public moneys supporting private agencies. Wickenden wrote:

Voluntary agencies, hard pressed to find needed financing on a voluntary basis...often turn a hungry eye toward the broader tax base. This is a natural but nonetheless dangerous temptation. For

the voluntary agencies to become the instrument of government, the reasons for their very existence is undermined (*Ibid.*: 45).

Purchase of care on a case by case basis using public moneys and publicly supported demonstration programs in voluntary agencies were the only exceptions that were justified. In the Congressional debates of 1962 that led to the first of a series of major changes in the social security provisions aimed at public welfare and child welfare practices, significant attention was paid to the role of social services for the first time. Appearing before the House Ways and Means Committee, Reid enunciated a cautious and cautionary position on the question of whether or not federal moneys should be used for purchase of care.

We commend the proposed legislation for recognizing the partnership of public and privately financed agencies by making provision for the purchase of services from private agencies when they can be more economically or effectively provided by a non-profit private agency....As a nation we have long expressed our religious and moral conviction of responsibility for our fellow man through our private social agencies....(Reid, 1962b: 3)

He went on to insist on the necessity for accountability in purchase of care, particularly with regard to federated funding: United Funds tended to assume that once an area of service provision received public funding, they no longer had a responsibility to continue providing moneys. This threatened the ability to

develop sound programs to combat dependency and neglect since "maximum public and private financing" were needed (*Ibid.*: 3-4).

However, Reid also said:

We also believe that experience in this country, particularly in child welfare...has clearly established the undesirability of developing large quasi-public social agencies which, though their management is private, receive all or most of their funds from public sources (*Ibid.*: 4).

Therefore, as previous statements had made clear, the method of funding should be by purchase of service, case by case, and never through large-scale subsidy (*Ibid.*). Reid also made a plea for federal reimbursement for institutional placements, these largely in private facilities. Elsewhere, and just days before, Reid had complained that United Funds were reducing their support of casework services, and he spoke more strongly about the need for good public programs, solid accountability of private agencies where purchase of care was practiced, and the dangerousness of legislation that required states and municipalities to purchase care from private agencies whenever such care was available, regardless of its quality (Reid, 1962a).

Expert Commentary on Public/Private Relationships

The rather polite discussion about public/private agency relations coming from the League and the Bureau received a more spirited if not acrimonious treatment in social work forums of the period. In June, 1961, the *Social Service*

Review (SSR) published an article by Coughlin that clearly stated his position in favor of expansion of social welfare and social work in the private sector.

Professional social work faces decision. Either it will continue its metamorphosis into a government bureau [and thus become merely civil servants] or it will identify itself as an association distinct from government? (Coughlin, 1961: 188-89). The latter was clearly preferred because of the flexibility, the freedom to advocate, the ability to act out of religious conviction, and its position as an avenue for an active citizenry, so important to the life of a democracy? (*Ibid.*: 189-90). But in order to survive, private welfare needed public funds; the alternative to no funding was social welfare...more or less coterminous with public welfare? (*Ibid.*: 191). The *SSR* also published a statement in its Notes and Comments section of the same issue (page 198) that noted that this was a controversial issue that had, in previous issues, received considerable criticism. Six months later, Ralph Kramer published a letter roundly countering Coughlin's position. Stating that voluntary agencies could easily become as bureaucratic as governmental ones, that voluntary agencies often failed to live up to their potential to be flexible and innovative, and that there was nothing voluntary about a voluntary agency which receives the bulk of its funds from governmental sources, Kramer concluded:

While the future of the voluntary agency may be endangered, it is dubious if tax subsidies will save it. What is required is a comprehensive re-evaluation of the voluntary agency and its future

rationale....This seems to be a much more constructive approach than looking to government to prop up a presumably tottering and failing voluntary system, or sounding the alarm over the two-headed monster of "public welfare bureaucracy" and its "civil service influence" (Kramer, 1961: 442).

In 1962, purchase of care was authorized for federal participation, and public welfare agencies could now purchase services from other *public* agencies with 75% federal reimbursement. Public child welfare services were now positioned to be available everywhere in the country, but the voluntary sector, except by indirect service provision, had gained little. The hope that foster care payments could be used for care in private institutions was explicitly rejected by the House Ways and Means Committee (Cohen and Ball, 1962). For child welfare advocates and for the private sector practitioners, only modest changes had been accomplished.

The amendments that were passed in 1962, as the next major set of amendments of 1967, were specifically aimed at reducing dependency of public assistance recipients and were only tangentially concerned with child welfare matters. They were to usher in a new era of expanded service provision, much of it in the voluntary sector. Debate about the appropriate public/private mix and relationship continued unabated in professional journals, with a rather constant theme of the need for greater clarity in the role of each, the urgent need for better

planning and coordination at the community level, and the caution that standards and accountability continued to require strengthening where public support of private agencies was concerned (e.g., Mencher, 1958; Johnson, 1959; Mayo, 1960; Levin, 1964; Kramer, 1966; Beck, 1970).

Examining the behavior of both the federal bureaucracy (the Children's Bureau) and its major advocacy constituency (the Child Welfare League of America) during this prelude to the dramatic changes that were about to take place, it is clear that both organizations continued to support the mantra of the Progressive Era: seeking incremental changes, the child welfare community, although under severe financial stress, looked primarily to expand the public sector as the primary vehicle to enhance comprehensive services to all who needed them. That this expansion might have some payoff for voluntary agencies was desired, but ambivalently. Tensions within the private sector, based largely on sectarian differences that reflected disagreements in their approaches to social intervention as well as philosophy about the proper role of government, inhibited the effectiveness of advocacy efforts (Schottland, 1968). Another significant factor was the nature of the socio-political environment of the times, conservative if not reactionary (this was the just post-McCarthy, after all) and not marked by any significant organized efforts for social change (Ehrenreich, 1987). Unlike the era of social activism preceding the establishment of the Children's Bureau in 1912 or even the Social Security Act of 1935, advocacy efforts for change were weak. Schottland, who had been Commissioner of Social Security

from 1954 to 1959 and who may have been a behind-the-scenes primary advocate for a purchased service system, held the position that, when it came to legislative advocacy, the social welfare experts had been more successful as blockers than builders of new systems of care during the period just under discussion (Schottland, 1968). By the 1970s, events had overcome the debate, and what we now call privatization was an established fact.

The Explosion of the Voluntary Sector under Federal Auspices: The Social Security Amendments of 1962 and 1967

There is a significant literature that documents the dramatic changes in social service delivery as a consequence of the Social Security amendments in the 1960s, particularly that of 1967. The changes leading to the mushrooming of purchased social services need to be put in context: the War on Poverty, the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare, the Community Mental Health Services Act were all built on a model of federal moneys being used to purchase services or care from private providers, whether individuals or agencies. In addition, significant reorganization of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the leadership chosen during the Johnson and Nixon administrations led to significant diminution of the role and power of the Children's Bureau while enhancing that of, first, the Welfare Administration (with a primary emphasis on public assistance) and, later, the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) (Breul and Gordon, 1973; Derthick, 1975; Wickenden, 1976).

Social services, never clearly defined, were unrealistically expected to solve the problem of growing welfare dependency in 1962; when they failed,

Congress became disillusioned. The amendments of 1967 were primarily focused on punitive welfare policies such as the Work Incentive Program (WIN), and social work advocates were consequently largely engaged in a battle to defeat as much of the get-tough provisions as they could, although they supported provisions to provide 90% federal funding to expanding child care for working parents. Apparently, they paid less attention to the fact that the proposed (and ultimately approved) amendments dropped the old prohibitions against federal funding of voluntary social services. As Wickenden noted, this policy shift represented "a departure from our traditional adherence to the interaction of independent, competing forces as a goad to progress" (Wickenden, 1976: 580) and it was one that "voluntary agencies *backed into*...without very much consideration of its implications" (*Ibid.* emphasis added). While the purchase of service language had been carefully debated in 1962, less attention was paid within the administration in 1967 and apparently it was almost ignored by the Child Welfare League: a memo to League affiliates in December, 1967, discussing achievements in the amendment process, says nothing about purchase of service (CWLA, 1967). Reid's testimony on various versions of the bills that ultimately became the 1967 amendments touched upon purchase of care in a positive way that again supported case-by-case support, but it certainly did not emphasize this point (CWLA 1967a).

The federal personnel responsible for administration of the purchased services in 1962 were cautious and traditional social workers; under the

reorganized HEW administration of the late '60s, they were expansionist, hostile to social work and loose in their oversight (Derthick, 1975). Definitions of eligibility were greatly expanded to include group eligibility for those living in poor communities and 'former and potential' public assistance recipients, and administration of social service expenditures on the state level were separated from the public welfare apparatus. Clever manipulation on the part of state officials in Illinois and California who successfully substituted federal moneys for state dollars in human services expenditures, soon were emulated or attempted by other states, leading the way to huge increases in federal outlays of moneys (Bruel and Gordon, 1973; Derthick, 1975; Mott, 1976). Federal expenditures for social services were \$194 million in 1963, nearly \$282 million in 1967, and over \$3 billion in 1982 (Morris, 1985: 159), notwithstanding the \$2.5 billion limit imposed by the Nixon administration in 1972 and the Title XX legislation of 1974 that codified the framework for federal spending and spending limits within the context of 'new federalism,' the predecessor to today's 'devolution.' Although much of the original Title XX legislation was geared towards the public assistance recipient population and was not focused on child welfare needs, by 1982, traditional child welfare activities such as protective services, foster care and institutional care had captured about 17% of the Title XX expenditures and child care (no doubt much of it for working welfare recipients) accounted for an additional 20% of the budget (about \$1.5 billion in federal dollars, half of the total federal expenditure on children's related services) (extrapolated from Morris,

1985: 161-2).

If the changes in the law affecting federal financing of voluntary services were the result of official bureaucratic policy-making rather than strenuous advocacy on the part of those who were likely to benefit from them, what were the reactions among the agencies and social welfare experts concerned with social services delivery? Critiquing the roles of the voluntary agency as ?vanguard, improver, supplementor, and guardian? as unfulfilled, largely because of funding difficulties and conservatism among agency directors and funding sources, and claiming that government agencies could do most of what the voluntary agencies claimed as their specialties, Kramer (1964) nonetheless predicted that the voluntary agency would continue, although it would become increasingly dependent on government funding and would, as a consequence, become accommodating to the roles set out for them by public funding agencies. Alvin Schorr, speaking at the annual Social Welfare Forum, also saw the growing power and dominance of government in social service delivery. He felt that the role of the voluntary agency as critic was crucial, and he urged that the private sector somehow remain critical in the face of inevitable acceptance of government funding while forecasting greatly expanded systems of care with mixed funding and a mixed delivery system (Schorr, 1965). And Wickenden (1965), at the same forum, gave credit to the civil rights movement that spurred the creation of the Economic Opportunity Act and opened up new and much more flexible ways for government?s sponsorship of community-driven solutions to poverty and, by

extension, looked to long-range changes in governmental funding of service delivery.

Reacting to these changes in 1965, Reid, in a shift of attitude, applauded the new cultural attitudes towards the federal engagement in social welfare and applauded the changes that were "creating sweeping changes in the programs of hundreds of voluntary agencies" (Reid, 1965: 62). He attributed at least part of the change to the increased security that religious minorities, particularly the Catholics felt, resulting in less resistance to public funding of purchased care as opposed to direct subsidy as evidenced in testimony on the 1962 amendments. Asserting that protective services belonged properly in the public domain, Reid nonetheless supported the "essentiality of private services" as faster, more flexible and more risk-taking (*Ibid*: 68). He concluded:

If private agencies are freed of their fear that they will be put out of business by the growth of public agencies, freed of their compulsion to hold on to a service, and committed to the ideal of promoting voluntarism, perhaps they can become the experimental, demonstrating, flexible organizations that they should be. Perhaps then they can serve to pioneer in the development of services that ultimately will be recognized by the public and assumed as a public function. (*Ibid*: 73-74)

By the late 1960s, the League became much more active in informing its

membership about proposed federal legislation as well as suggesting strategies to local affiliates in how to frame their positions to federal, state and local officials. The position of Consultant on Public Affairs was created, and an office in Washington, D.C. was established as a base for active lobbying purposes to supplement the organization's main office in New York City (Steiner, chap. 7). Both the League agencies and the Children's Bureau were eclipsed during the late 1960s and early '70s by the flexibility of and increased funding for services connected to public welfare, including child care. Title XX, enacted in 1974, augmented the position of children's services. More importantly in the long run, the rediscovery of child abuse and neglect focused the public's and particularly the politicians' interest and support for more active child welfare intervention. The Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Act of 1973 resurrected the Children's Bureau to some prominence, provided increased funding to state child welfare agencies and various demonstration programs, and--most of all--drew attention to the behaviors of mostly poor parents from whom children needed rescue (Nelson, 1984; Pelton, 1987). The subsequent Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 created the basis for vastly increased federal moneys to assist in the operation of state agencies and for large amounts of purchased care. An industry of services, most of them under the general rubric of 'family intervention' and nearly all of them purchased by public child welfare agencies from private providers, followed.

As early as 1970, the evolving pattern of nominally voluntary agencies,

nearly totally dependent on government money and beholden to the purposes set out for them by public funders, was critiqued as distorting the independence and democratic nature of the agencies as they became "quasi-nongovernmental agencies" (Beck, 1970). Thus, the kind of control over form and function complained about by Joseph Doolin at the beginning of this paper was recognized early, but most agencies ignored the warning.

There is another perspective on this matter, however. From familiarity with the child welfare field, the writer is aware that many of the agencies from which the public sector purchases have succeeded in selling what they have to offer, conforming to what Smith and Lipsky (1993) call a mutually dependent relationship. Leaving aside homemaker and child care services, most of those working in the voluntary agencies from whom services are purchased are trained as psychotherapists, and most of what they have sold has been therapy in various forms. The question, then, of which is the tail and which is the dog is not really resolved, but the pattern of service delivery has been.

Some Theoretical Considerations and Conclusions

In recent years, academic debate about the growth and form of welfare state programs has been carried on with vigor. Kramer's contribution to the understanding of "American exceptionalism" has been discussed above and points to the persistence of the value-laden preference for private solutions to public problems in the American context (Kramer, 1964). From one point of view, then, the introduction of federal funding for purchased services can be seen

as an example of incrementalism where an old pattern --public funding of voluntary agencies-- previously limited to the state and local levels expanded to include the federal government once the idea of an expanded federal presence in social welfare activity was accepted politically.

Some, e.g., Piven and Cloward (1993) argue that it requires disorder, or at least considerable pressure from outside the political system, to bring about change. No such concerted pressure on the part of the voluntary agencies can be observed here, and the changes seem dramatic only in retrospect. One reason may be that the voluntary sector, as advocate, was not cohesive in large part because there were internal disagreements, particularly among the religious factions, as to the desired policy around public funding and in part because the constituency was itself allied formally with the public agencies. This constituency was in trouble financially --perhaps because the American population was coming to accept that many of its activities were appropriately being taken over by public agencies-- and thus cautiously looked for increased public funding but did not push for it.

Skocpol and her associates have argued that government bureaucrats themselves may originate and elaborate new forms of social provision and that these then develop constituencies that contribute to "social politics" in what they call and "institutional-political process" (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, 1988). This thesis seems confirmed by studies such as Derthick's (1975) that put great emphasis on the role of bureaucrats as law-initiators as well as implementers.

The case presented here shows, it is hoped, the complexities involved in what became the privatized social service sector we know today. Inside bureaucrats who led the Children's Bureau over decades held on to traditional beliefs about the necessity for a strong public sector, preferred to enlarge publicly run programs, but also appreciated the strength of the private sector and did not want to alienate it. Other bureaucrats who ascended to prominence in the late 1960s and who came from a tradition of purchasing care were able to institute new policies through law-making and rule-writing to favor publicly funded but privately provided services. The constituency that stood to gain, at least in the children's services field, were not the prime movers; rather, they fell in line, caught up, and took advantage. Yet, as Wickenden (1976) pointed out, outside agitation was not an inconsiderable factor in this story: the civil rights movement and the more violent expressions that followed (Piven and Cloward, 1993) certainly prompted the government response known as the War on Poverty, and this response included the creation of many new community-based agencies funded directly by the federal government. The 1960s, a turbulent time, allowed for breaking of rules. One of them was the long-held prohibition against federal funding of private endeavors. Over time, the more radical uses of federal funding dissipated; the use of federal funds to support voluntary services, however, became an institutionalized pattern in the American social service delivery system.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper was presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for Research in Non-Profit and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), Seattle, Washington, Nov. 6, 1998 and at the Social Welfare History Symposium, Annual Program Meeting, Council on Social Work Education, San Francisco, California, March 12, 1999.

1. Modern European states are characterized by having broad-scale, universal social and economic policies under public auspices. The U.S. has been slow to develop the few universal policies it supports (public education is virtually the only one, with Social Security nearly a universal program); most public programs are means-tested and cover only a portion of the population technically eligible (either by income or by condition) to receive them.
2. A recent interpretation of the social activists of the Progressive Era, including the social workers who led the Children's Bureau, emphasizes the traditional scrutinizing attitudes that accompanied many of the programs they advocated. Thus, mothers' pensions were to be for 'worthy mothers' only (usually widows) and were to be given only when accompanied by home visits and advice from public social workers. This position, adopted in the Aid to Dependent Children component of the Social Security Act, stood in contrast to the Unemployment Insurance provisions that provided income to unemployed male workers as a matter of right (Gordon, 1994). Bell (1965) held a similar view.
3. A recent (1997) U.S. Supreme Court decision, *Agostini v. Felton*, has eroded the long-held objection to public funding for parochial education.
4. The records of the Child Welfare League of America are housed at the Charles Babbage Institute, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota and were reviewed there.
5. Schottland may have been the moving force behind federal funding of voluntary services. There are intimations of his preference for this model of service provision in various of the documents reviewed for this paper. Ralph Kramer, in a personal communication (October, 1998) confirmed that this is a likely proposition. As Commissioner of Public Welfare in California, the position he held prior to becoming Social Security Commissioner, Schottland made considerable use of purchased from private agencies, and he himself came from the Jewish communal field. Bernard Coughlin's dissertation that examined sectarian agencies' relationships with government was written under the direction of Charles Schottland at the Heller School, Brandeis University.

6. Virginia Burns, who was employed by the Children's Bureau and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime in the early 1960s, cautions that the Bureau's authority and influence were very much diminished at that time. Oettinger in particular was considered a political hold-over (her father was Attorney General Herbert Brownell during the Eisenhower administration) who was preoccupied with developing standards and promoting traditional methods of practice. She was not innovative or adaptive to change. (Personal communication, December 7, 1998).

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